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Exploring Normative Creativity: Testing the Relationship
Between Cognitive Flexibility and Sexual Identity
Julie Konik1,3 and Mary Crawford2
Brown (1989) proposed that lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals possess greater
“normative creativity” and flexibility than heterosexuals because they have fewer norms
for living in heterosexually dominated society. In this article we explore one possible in-
dividual difference between heterosexuals and nonheterosexuals in the domain of norma-
tive creativity by examining the relationship between cognitive flexibility and sexual identity
among 358 university students. Participants with sexual identities not directed toward one
gender exclusively (e.g., bisexual, biaffectionate, or queer) scored significantly higher on a
measure of cognitive flexibility than did heterosexual and gay/lesbian participants; the latter
two groups did not differ from each other. These results suggest that it is having a nonexclu-
sive sexual identity, rather than a lesbian or gay identity, that is related to greater cognitive
flexibility.
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Psychology has undergone a radical shift in
its conceptualization of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
(LGB) sexual minorities. Until 1973, homosexual-
ity was pathologized and listed in the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM;
Bayer, 1987). However, the depathologizing of ho-
mosexuality did not immediately lead either to main-
stream conceptualizations of LGBs as psychologi-
cally healthy or to the integration of LGB samples
into psychological research. Rather, as Brown (1989)
noted, lesbian and gay issues were “not in the core
curriculum in reality or emotionally” (p. 446).
In light of the marginalization of LGB psychol-
ogy, researchers (e.g., Brown, 1989, 1996; Firestein,
1996; Kitzinger, 2001) have called for psychological
science to undergo a paradigm shift and for psychol-
ogists to adopt the lens of sexual minority perspec-
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tives in order to gain new insights on the human ex-
perience. An exploration of the psychological well-
being and resilience of sexual minorities, who cre-
ate and maintain their sexual identities in a society
punctuated with homophobia, can lead to a better
understanding of how socially marginalized “others”
achieve psychological growth.
One specific area of LGB psychological strength
has been proposed by Brown (1989), who suggested
that by being “normatively different” LGBs develop
greater creativity than heterosexuals in generating
scripts for their lives. She provided the example of
Clunis and Green’s research (Clunis & Green, 1988)
with lesbian couples. Because the women in their
study had few models of how to be a lesbian in a
committed relationship, they were left to improvise
ways to live their lives. As Brown (1989) summa-
rized, “. . . by lacking clear rules about how to be les-
bian and gay in the world, we have made up the rules
as we go along” (p. 451).
Brown’s theory of normative creativity sug-
gested to us the intriguing notion that LGB indi-
viduals might score higher than heterosexuals on a
measure of cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility
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is defined as “a person’s (a) awareness that in any
given situation there are options and alternatives
available, (b) willingness to be flexible and adapt to
the situation, and (c) self-efficacy or belief that one
has the ability to be flexible” (Martin & Anderson,
1998, p. 1).
To date, only a few empirical studies of gender
and sexuality have included cognitive flexibility as a
construct of interest. In a study of gender role ori-
entation, Carter (1985) suggested that androgynous
individuals may demonstrate more cognitive flexi-
bility because their personalities incorporate both
traditionally feminine and masculine traits. Carter’s
data supported this theory to a limited degree, as
androgynous individuals scored higher on a mea-
sure of cognitive flexibility than did those who were
feminine or undifferentiated (i.e., low on both tradi-
tionally feminine and masculine traits). There were
no other significant differences in cognitive flexibil-
ity by gender role orientation in this study. How-
ever, Windle (1986) found no systematic differences
in cognitive flexibility by gender role orientation. It
appears that future research is necessary to under-
stand fully the relationship between gender role ori-
entation and cognitive flexibility.
Similar to androgyny’s incorporation of femi-
nine and masculine traits, bisexuality involves as-
pects of both same-sex and cross-sex sexuality. Zinik
(1985) theorized a “flexibility model of bisexuality”
(p. 7) that proposes that bisexuals possess high lev-
els of cognitive flexibility, as they traverse between
heterosexual and homosexual communities. To our
knowledge, only one (unpublished) study has been
conducted on the relationship between cognitive
flexibility and sexuality. Zinik (1983) used Troldahl
and Powell’s Short-Form Dogmatism Scale (Troldahl
& Powell, 1965)to measure cognitive flexibility. This
measure is based on Rokeach’s Dogmatism Scale
(Rokeach, 1960)and conceptualization of dogmatism
as the degree of openness or closedness in one’s cog-
nitive systems. Zinik’s 419 participants included 64
heterosexual men, 103 heterosexual women, 61 gay
men, 53 lesbians, 74 bisexual men, and 64 bisex-
ual women. All heterosexual participants were stu-
dents in undergraduate human sexuality courses at
the University of California at Santa Barbara, and
lesbian, gay, and bisexual participants were recruited
from sexual minority social and support organiza-
tions in California.
Zinik’s results provided only limited support for
a relationship between sexual identity and cognitive
flexibility, as bisexual women scored lowest in dog-
matism, followed by heterosexual women, lesbians,
gay men, heterosexual men, and bisexual men, re-
spectively. Although the effect of participant sex was
significant, there was no effect for sexual identity cat-
egory (heterosexual, lesbian/gay, or bisexual), and
the interaction between participant sex and sexual
identity was marginal. Zinik proposed that the main
effect for sex may be attributable to the inappropri-
ateness of using a dogmatism scale to measure cog-
nitive flexibility, to the dogmatism scale’s insensitiv-
ity to ideological changes that occurred during the
women’s movement (which may have led women to
score lower on the scale), or to self-selection among
the bisexual female participants. Zinik proposed that
his research be replicated using more comprehensive
measures of cognitive flexibility. The present study
was designed to do that.
In light of Brown’s theory of sexual minority
normative creativity (Brown, 1989), we hypothesized
that lesbian, gay, and bisexual participants would




Participants in this study were 358 undergrad-
uate and graduate students. They were recruited in
their classes at an eastern university, and some re-
ceived course credit for their participation. To find
more LGB participants, surveys were also distributed
at LGB and LGB-friendly conferences, student or-
ganization meetings, and on e-mail listserves. Be-
cause of the snowball-sampling method utilized in
this study (we distributed surveys to those involved
in the LGB community and requested that they dis-
tribute them to others), an exact response rate could
not be calculated.
Two hundred and two participants identified
themselves as heterosexual, 100 as gay or lesbian, 40
as bisexual, 14 as “other,” one chose not to identify
sexual orientation, and one had missing data for this
question (the page with this item was detached from
the survey). Ninety-eight participants were men, 257
were women, and three were transgendered. The
mean age was 22.3 years, with a standard deviation of
5.6 years. The sample was predominantly European
American; 83.9% identified themselves as European
American, 5.9% as African American, 2.5% as
Asian American, 3.1% as Latino/a, and 4.5% as
“other.”
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Measures
The Cognitive Flexibility Scale (Martin &
Rubin, 1995) was used to assess participants’ per-
ceptions of the options and alternatives available
to them in everyday situations. Questions from this
scale include: “I can find workable solutions to seem-
ingly unsolvable problems” and “In any given situa-
tion, I am able to act appropriately.” The scale con-
sists of 12 items on a 6-point Likert scale, which are
summed to obtain a total score, M = 55.46, SD =
7.34 (Martin & Rubin, 1995). This scale demon-
strated an internal consistency rating of .76, and a
test–retest reliability of .83 (Martin & Rubin, 1995),
and the internal consistency for this measure in this
study was .77.
Several studies have supported the validity
of the Cognitive Flexibility Scale, as it positively
correlated with self-insight (Grant, Franklin, &
Langford, 2002), tolerance for disagreement (Martin,
Anderson, & Thweatt, 1998), multicultural sensi-
tivity (Kim, Cartwright, Asay, & D’Andrea, 2003),
social flexibility (Singelis, Hubbard, Her, & An,
2003), communication flexibility (Martin & Rubin,
1995), assertiveness, and responsiveness (Martin &
Anderson, 1998). The Cognitive Flexibility Scale also
negatively correlated with rigidity of attitudes re-
garding personal habits (Martin & Rubin, 1995).
Sexual identity was assessed via a self-report
item. The question read: “How would you identify
your sexual orientation? Please circle the most ac-
curate response. Please circle only one response.”
The response options included heterosexual, homo-
sexual (gay or lesbian), bisexual, other (with space
for an explanation of this response), and choose not
to identify.
Procedure
Participants were given (in person or by mail)
a packet of surveys that consisted of a demographic
information sheet, six questions about sexual iden-
tity and preferences, and The Cognitive Flexibility
Scale.4 They were asked to complete the packet at
their convenience and return it by mail in a postpaid
envelope. Participants also received a letter inform-
4Data presented here are part of a larger study on sexual iden-
tity and overall identity development. Results from other surveys
administered at this same time are reported elsewhere (Konik &
Stewart, in press).
ing them that they were not obligated to participate
in this research and that they were expressing their
consent to be participants by completing the survey.
RESULTS
A 3 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
conducted using cognitive flexibility scores as the
dependent variable and self-identified sexual orien-
tation (heterosexual, lesbian/gay, or bisexual/other)
and participant sex (male or female) as the inde-
pendent variables. The three transgendered partici-
pants, the one who did not label her sexuality, and
the one with a missing response to this question were
excluded from the analysis. Participants who labeled
their sexual identity as “other” were combined with
bisexuals because the labels they provided for their
sexuality (e.g., “biaffectionate,” “queer”) reflected a
“nonexclusive” identity that is not restricted to at-
traction toward only one sex. Thus, the sexual iden-
tity groups consisted of heterosexual (n = 202), les-
bian/gay (n = 100), and bisexual/other participants
(n = 54).
The ANOVA indicated a significant effect for
sexual identity, F(2, 349) = 4.07, p = .02. There was
no effect for participant sex, F(1, 349) = 0.19, p =
.66, and the interaction between sex and sexual iden-
tity was not significant, F(2, 349) = 1.87, p = .16,
R2 = .036. Tukey post hoc tests revealed that par-
ticipants with a nonexclusive sexual identity scored
higher on cognitive flexibility than did those who
identified as heterosexual or lesbian/gay, p < .05. No
significant differences were found between hetero-
sexuals and lesbians/gays on cognitive flexibility, p =
.99 (see Table I).
A follow-up analysis was conducted to test the
possibility that this effect was due to the “other”
group, as they may have rejected all of the standard
categories of sexual identity. To test this possibil-
ity, we conducted an ANOVA to compare partici-
pants with exclusive sexual identities (heterosexual,
lesbian, or gay) and those with nonexclusive sexual
Table I. Means and Standard Deviations for Cognitive Flexibility
Scale Scores as a Function of Sexual Identity
M SD
Heterosexual (n = 42 men, 160 women) 58.73a 5.10
Lesbian/gay (n = 45 men, 55 women) 58.65a 6.32
Bisexual/other (n = 8 men, 31 women) 60.94b 5.11
Total 59.01 5.52
Note. Means with different superscripts differed at p < .05.
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identities (bisexual); the “other” identified partici-
pants were excluded from this analysis. As in the re-
sults presented above, participants with a nonexclu-
sive bisexual identity (M = 60.87, SD = 5.20) scored
higher on cognitive flexibility than did those with
an exclusive heterosexual, lesbian, or gay identity
(M = 58.70, SD = 5.52), F(1, 338) = 5.25, p = .02,
R2 = .025.
DISCUSSION
The results of this study contrast with those
reported by Zinik (1983) and provide preliminary
insights into a possible relationship between sex-
ual identity and cognitive flexibility. Both men and
women with a nonexclusive sexual identity scored
higher on a measure of cognitive flexibility than did
heterosexuals or lesbians/gay men; there was no sig-
nificant difference between the latter two groups.
Unlike Zinik (1983), who found that men scored
higher on dogmatism, we obtained no effects for sex
of participant. This difference could be due to the
type of measure used (dogmatism vs. cognitive flexi-
bility). Alternatively, shifts in gender roles in the two
decades since Zinik’s study may have decreased sex
differences in dogmatism.
It is interesting that our gay and lesbian par-
ticipants did not differ from our heterosexual par-
ticipants in cognitive flexibility scores. As university
students in their early 20s, these participants are con-
structing their sexual identities in a time of increasing
social acceptance for sexual minorities. Although ho-
mophobia is still rampant in our society, attitudes to-
ward sexual minorities are gradually becoming more
favorable (Herek, 2002). However, one recent study
of heterosexual undergraduates showed that bisexu-
als in general (and bisexual men in particular) were
viewed more negatively than were either lesbians or
gay men (Eliason, 1997). It seems that, although at-
titudes toward gay men and lesbians have become
more favorable, bisexuals and those with a nonexclu-
sive sexual identity still are viewed as most deviant.
One interesting direction for future research is
to explore the issue of cognitive flexibility and sexual
identity among transgendered individuals. The pro-
cess of sexual identity formation and maintenance in
transgendered populations is one that warrants fu-
ture attention, as the categories of sexual identity
are exceptionally complex in transgendered commu-
nities (e.g., If a preoperative female-to-male trans-
gendered woman is engaged in a sexual relation-
ship with a biological female who identifies as a
man, would this person’s sexual identity be homosex-
ual, heterosexual, bisexual, or something else?) The
norms for sexual identity development among trans-
gendered individuals appear to be quite fluid, and,
consequently, the role of cognitive flexibility in de-
veloping these norms is an interesting topic for future
research.5
One limitation of Zinik’s study and our own is
that both used single self-report measures of cog-
nitive flexibility. Further investigations with multi-
ple measures of cognitive flexibility [e.g., the Al-
ternate Uses Test (Wilson, Christensen, Merrifield,
& Guilford, 1960), the Test of Behavioral Rigidity
(Schaie, 1955), and anagram word puzzles (Walker,
Liston, Hobson, & Stickgold, 2002)] would lead to
a more nuanced view of what kinds of creativity
and flexibility are linked with sexual identity. Also,
considering the limited number of participants with
nonexclusive sexual identities in this study, further
research with a greater number of such participants
would help to determine whether these results are
replicable.
Perhaps our most intriguing finding is that dif-
ferences in cognitive flexibility were not found be-
tween heterosexuals and gay/lesbian participants de-
spite the greater power provided by the sample size
of these two populations. Instead, the difference
that emerged was between those with exclusive and
nonexclusive sexual identities. Our study has demon-
strated that individuals who are most flexible about
the gender of their sexual and affectional partners
also show flexibility outside the realm of sexuality,
in their overall cognitive style. This is a novel finding
that may reflect normative openness and creativity in
those with nonexclusive sexual identities.
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